Iran is an oil-rich nation that does not require nuclear energy to meet its domestic energy needs. Yet it has developed a nuclear program that, in my view, is clearly not intended solely for peaceful purposes. The strongest indication of this is the manner in which Iran has constructed and protected its facilities, locating key elements of the program deep underground. No country with a genuinely peaceful nuclear program has any reason to take such extraordinary measures to shield its facilities from attack. The obvious purpose is to protect the program from a directed bombing campaign. Only a fool, in my view, would argue otherwise.
Furthermore, Iran has enriched uranium to the 60 percent level, far beyond what is generally required for civilian nuclear power generation. Left unchecked, Iran could eventually reach weapons-grade enrichment at approximately 90 percent and potentially acquire the capacity to produce multiple nuclear weapons. For a small country such as Israel, that possibility represents an existential threat. If Iran were ever to act upon the extraordinarily hostile rhetoric that has emanated from its leadership toward Israel, the consequences could be catastrophic—nothing less than a national Armageddon.
Iran has been working on its nuclear program for several decades. It might well have reached a weapons-producing capability already were it not for a combination of Israeli covert operations and cyberattacks, including the reported killing of several Iranian nuclear scientists and the devastating impact of the Stuxnet computer virus, which specifically targeted Iranian centrifuges. Israel, however, is running out of options. The window for preventing Iran from reaching an irreversible nuclear capability is narrowing.
There is also the broader question of outside assistance. Iran has likely benefited, to varying degrees, from technical knowledge, equipment, expertise, or other forms of assistance connected to countries such as Russia, China, North Korea, and Pakistan. The world is a wicked place, and nuclear technology rarely develops in complete isolation. Tehran has repeatedly issued threats against Israel, including rhetoric about its destruction, while portraying Israel as the “Little Satan” and the United States as the “Great Satan.” In this respect, the Iranian regime has been remarkably consistent.
Iran has also been waging a broader war against Israel and, by extension, the West through its network of proxy forces. Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and the Assad regime in Syria have all served, in different ways, as instruments of Iranian regional influence and military pressure. Yet these forces have suffered severe setbacks over the past two years, significantly weakening Iran's regional position.
At present, Israel possesses significant air superiority over Iran and has demonstrated the ability to strike Iranian nuclear and military infrastructure. A sustained Israeli campaign could potentially set the Iranian nuclear program back by several years. However, the deepest and most heavily fortified facilities present a much greater challenge. Neutralizing those installations could require American assistance, particularly in the form of specialized capabilities capable of penetrating hardened underground facilities.
Israel is already targeting Iranian nuclear and military sites and has inflicted considerable damage. The strikes have reportedly eliminated or incapacitated a number of senior Iranian military figures and scientific personnel associated with the country's nuclear and military apparatus. Israel is also focusing heavily on Iranian missile-launching capabilities and launch sites, with the objective of reducing Iran's ability to retaliate against Israeli territory.
At the same time, there appears to be a concerted effort by Western intelligence services to encourage popular opposition to the Iranian regime from within the country. Whether such efforts can actually produce a meaningful political revolution remains uncertain. The authorities in Tehran retain tight control over the information environment, and the absence of a genuinely independent media means that the extent of popular dissent inside Iran is difficult to measure. What is being reported may represent only a fraction of what is actually occurring on the ground.
Iranian missile and drone attacks against Israel have caused damage, including in heavily populated civilian areas, despite the fact that the vast majority of incoming threats have been intercepted by Israel's layered air-defense systems, including Iron Dome and related technologies. The fact that Israel has been able to intercept such a large proportion of the incoming attacks should not obscure the danger posed by the weapons that do get through.
The likelihood of Israeli ground forces entering Iran remains very low. The prospect of American troops being deployed on the ground appears similarly remote. The conflict is therefore likely to remain primarily an air, missile, intelligence, cyber, and special-operations contest rather than develop into a conventional ground invasion of Iran.
Meanwhile, pro-Iranian sources, along with sympathetic voices within the Russian and Chinese propaganda ecosystems, have amplified the possibility of a broader American military intervention. The objective, at least in part, is to generate opposition in the West to any US-assisted Israeli campaign against Iran. This propaganda effort has clearly resonated with portions of both the political Left and the MAGA Right, despite their otherwise profound differences. The larger question, however, is whether the American public will ultimately support preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. My assessment is that a majority of Americans—Democrats, Republicans, and Independents alike—continue to regard Iran as a significant global threat and believe that the regime should not be allowed to obtain nuclear weapons.
Extremists on all sides have predictably exploited the conflict to inflame anti-Semitic sentiment and rally their respective political bases. The modern information environment has only intensified the problem. Search algorithms and social-media platforms can amplify highly partisan sources without providing sufficient context regarding their origins or political affiliations. This raises legitimate questions about why particular outlets, including Al Jazeera, which is based in Qatar, are so frequently elevated as authoritative sources of information in Western search results.
President Trump's two-week pause before making a final decision on American involvement could ultimately provide Israel with additional time to degrade Iran's military capabilities. Israel is already using that time to concentrate on Iranian missile infrastructure and launch sites, thereby reducing Iran's ability to mount sustained counterattacks.
European attempts to mediate a ceasefire are unlikely to accomplish much unless they are ultimately reinforced by the United States. The jury remains out on precisely how American diplomacy will shape the conflict. Thus far, Iran has rejected American demands that it abandon or permanently shut down the elements of its nuclear program associated with weapons development. The Iranian leadership may view the nuclear option as one of its most powerful strategic cards, particularly if it believes the West is ultimately seeking regime change.
The Iranian leadership has watched what happened to regimes in Libya and Iraq and may have drawn a very straightforward conclusion: a state without a credible strategic deterrent can become vulnerable to foreign intervention and regime overthrow. From Tehran's perspective, therefore, the pursuit of a nuclear capability may be viewed not simply as a means of threatening Israel, but as an insurance policy against the possibility of regime change. That calculation is precisely what makes the Iranian nuclear question so dangerous—and why Israel and the United States face increasingly difficult choices about how far they are prepared to go to prevent Tehran from crossing the nuclear threshold.
