Monday, November 16, 2026

How did Louis XIV’s territorial ambitions manifest themselves? Entry 39

Louis XIV made no secret of his territorial ambitions. Four major wars defined much of his reign: the War of Devolution (1667–1668), the Franco-Dutch War (1672–1678), the Nine Years’ War (1688–1697), and the War of the Spanish Succession (1701–1714). I will discuss the first three here and deal with the War of the Spanish Succession separately.

In the War of Devolution, Louis XIV used a relatively obscure inheritance principle known as the Jus Devolutionis as a legal pretext for invading the Spanish Netherlands. The principle, recognized in parts of the Low Countries, gave children from a first marriage preferential inheritance rights over those from a subsequent marriage. Louis argued that this gave his wife, Maria Theresa of Spain, a claim to territories belonging to her father, Philip IV of Spain, despite his having renounced his inheritance rights when he married her.

French forces invaded the Spanish Netherlands in 1667 and encountered relatively little resistance. They captured a number of important towns and fortresses, including Lille, Tournai, Douai, and Charleroi. French forces also occupied much of Franche-Comté, although the territory was returned to Spain as part of the peace settlement.

Louis’s rapid successes alarmed the other European powers, particularly the Dutch Republic, which feared that a French takeover of the Spanish Netherlands would place France directly on its southern frontier. England and Sweden joined the Dutch in forming the Triple Alliance of 1668, pressuring Louis to end the war. The resulting Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle (Aachen) forced France to return most of its conquests but allowed Louis to retain several strategically important towns, including Lille.

The war established an important pattern that would recur throughout Louis XIV’s reign: France could achieve rapid military victories, but the expansion of French power repeatedly provoked coalitions of other European states determined to maintain the balance of power.

The Franco-Dutch War (1672–1678), sometimes called the Dutch War, began in 1672. Louis XIV’s France initially attacked the Dutch Republic with the support of England and several German states. Sweden was also aligned with France diplomatically but did not play the same direct role in the initial invasion. The Dutch, meanwhile, received support from Brandenburg-Prussia, the Holy Roman Empire, and Spain. England withdrew from the conflict in 1674, after which the Dutch coalition increasingly became a broader European alliance against France.

Although much of the fighting took place in the Low Countries, the war expanded into a wider global conflict. Fighting occurred in the Rhineland, Spain, Sicily, the Caribbean, and North America, reflecting the increasingly worldwide nature of European imperial competition.

The French invasion initially appeared devastating. French armies crossed the Rhine and rapidly overran large portions of the Dutch Republic. Faced with the prospect of national defeat, the Dutch opened the dikes and deliberately flooded large areas of the countryside, creating a defensive water barrier that halted the French advance. The Dutch navy also performed effectively, preventing France and England from gaining control of the seas.

The Dutch resistance transformed the character of the war. Political divisions within the Dutch Republic eventually strengthened the position of William of Orange, who became the central figure in organizing resistance to France. The French were gradually pushed back, while the conflict spread into the Spanish Netherlands and other European theaters.

The war developed into a costly struggle of attrition. Louis XIV remained unwilling to abandon his territorial gains, but the expansion of the anti-French coalition increasingly threatened to overwhelm France. England’s withdrawal had already weakened the French position, and Louis became increasingly concerned about the possibility of further powers joining the coalition.

The Treaties of Nijmegen (1678–1679) eventually brought the conflict to an end. France emerged as the principal territorial victor. It retained important acquisitions, including Franche-ComtĂ© and a number of towns in the Spanish Netherlands. Spain was forced to recognize many of France’s gains, while the Dutch Republic emerged from the war with its independence intact.

The Franco-Dutch War was arguably Louis XIV’s most successful major war in terms of territorial expansion. It demonstrated the effectiveness of French military power while also convincing many European states that Louis’s ambitions posed a serious threat to the existing balance of power.

The War of the League of Augsburg (1688–1697) is also known as the Nine Years’ War or the War of the Grand Alliance. In North America, the conflict is generally known as King William’s War. Unlike the earlier conflicts, France faced a broad coalition of European powers, including the Dutch Republic, England, the Holy Roman Empire, Spain, and Savoy. Portugal later joined the coalition as well.

The war began after Louis XIV invaded the Rhineland in an attempt to secure France’s eastern frontier and strengthen his position in the German states. His actions encouraged the formation of a much larger anti-French coalition. The resulting conflict became a major struggle over the balance of power in Europe.

The Spanish Netherlands again served as an important battlefield, while major campaigns also took place in the Rhineland, Catalonia, northern Italy, and the territories of the Duchy of Savoy. Naval warfare was also important, particularly after England became fully involved under William III.

The conflict extended beyond Europe. In North America, English and French colonists fought along the frontier, supported by their respective Indigenous allies. The war therefore became another example of how European rivalries had developed into conflicts spanning the Atlantic world.

Neither side was able to achieve a decisive victory. France remained militarily formidable but faced growing financial pressures, while the Grand Alliance struggled to force Louis XIV into a complete retreat. The Treaty of Ryswick (1697) finally brought the war to an end.

France retained significant territory and, importantly, kept most of Alsace, including Strasbourg, which had been annexed earlier in Louis’s reign. However, Louis was forced to recognize William III as King of England and return several territories captured during the war. France also returned Freiburg, Breisach, and Philippsburg to the Holy Roman Emperor and restored the Duchy of Lorraine to Duke Leopold.

In the colonial sphere, France retained Pondicherry in India and regained Acadia in North America, although the exact boundaries and ownership of Acadia would remain disputed. The Treaty of Ryswick therefore represented more of a compromise than a decisive French victory.

The three wars demonstrate the evolution of Louis XIV’s foreign policy. The War of Devolution revealed the potential of French military power but also provoked European resistance. The Franco-Dutch War brought France substantial territorial gains while encouraging the formation of a wider anti-French coalition. By the Nine Years’ War, Louis was increasingly confronting a coordinated European effort to contain French expansion. This balance-of-power struggle would reach its greatest intensity with the War of the Spanish Succession, which would dominate the final years of Louis XIV’s reign.


The Crisis in Modern Feminism Essay 50

 There was a time when the central proposition of feminism was both simple and revolutionary: women are individuals, not dependents, and they should possess the same fundamental rights, freedoms, opportunities, and responsibilities as men. The great achievement of earlier feminism was to challenge the legal, cultural, and institutional barriers that prevented women from exercising those rights. Its objective was not to create a permanent political distinction between men and women, but to make that distinction increasingly irrelevant when determining a person's opportunities in life.

Something changed along the way. Modern feminism has, in many quarters, become increasingly intertwined with identity politics, intersectionality, and a broader politics of group grievance. The individual woman has sometimes been replaced by the abstract category of "women," and that category is increasingly interpreted through a hierarchy of race, class, sexuality, gender, privilege, and oppression. The result is a movement that can become less concerned with individual autonomy and more obsessed with collective identity.

This transformation creates a profound contradiction. You see feminism originally challenged the idea that individuals should be judged according to the group into which they were born. Yet a version of contemporary feminism can sometimes make precisely that group identity the starting point for political analysis. A woman is no longer simply an individual who happens to be female; she can be categorized according to an increasingly elaborate matrix of identities that determines whether she is regarded as privileged, oppressed, marginalized, or sufficiently representative of the movement.

The irony is difficult to miss. A philosophy that began by insisting that women should be treated as individuals can become a philosophy in which women are once again defined primarily by their membership in a collective.

Identity politics is not inherently illegitimate. People naturally organize around shared experiences, and women have historically faced forms of discrimination that men did not experience in the same way. Collective political action was necessary to challenge many of those barriers. The problem begins when collective identity ceases to be a means of addressing particular injustices and becomes the dominant explanation for social reality.

Once that happens, feminism can become a politics of grievance. Genuine discrimination and historical injustice remain important subjects, yet there is a significant difference between recognizing injustice and constructing an enduring political identity around victimhood. A movement that derives much of its moral authority from identifying oppression can eventually face an uncomfortable incentive: resolving the problem may weaken the political rationale for the movement itself.

The danger is not that every feminist is motivated by such considerations. The danger lies in the structure of an ideology that can make grievance politically valuable. Every disagreement can become evidence of patriarchy, every disparity can become evidence of discrimination, and every criticism can be interpreted as another manifestation of the system being challenged.

Such reasoning can become self-sealing. If a woman disagrees with the prevailing feminist interpretation of an issue, her disagreement can be explained through internalized misogyny, false consciousness, privilege, or insufficient awareness of systemic oppression. Her identity as a woman therefore does not necessarily give her greater authority to disagree; in some circumstances, it can make her disagreement evidence that she has somehow failed to understand her own interests.

That is a remarkable departure from the principle of individual autonomy.

A similar problem occurs when feminism adopts a hierarchy of voices. The quality of an argument should ultimately depend upon its evidence, reasoning, consistency, and explanatory power. Identity politics can instead encourage the belief that some people possess greater authority to speak because of their identity while others should defer because they occupy a supposedly privileged position.

This creates an intellectual environment in which disagreement can become a moral transgression. A man who challenges a feminist argument may be dismissed because he is a man. A woman who challenges it may be dismissed for failing to understand the supposedly universal experience of women. Neither response addresses the substance of the argument.

The same phenomenon can occur when feminism becomes absorbed into intersectionality. Intersectionality was developed as a way of examining how different forms of disadvantage can interact, and the framework can illuminate experiences that are otherwise difficult to understand. Its application can nevertheless become increasingly complicated when individuals are placed within hierarchies based upon race, class, sexuality, gender identity, disability, or other characteristics.

The individual then becomes a collection of categories. Political analysis becomes a process of determining where each person sits within a hierarchy of privilege and disadvantage. Such a framework can be particularly corrosive to the liberal principle that every person possesses equal moral worth.

Modern feminism also risks becoming trapped by the concept of equality of outcome. Equal rights and equal opportunity are fundamentally different from identical outcomes. Men and women can have equal legal rights, equal dignity, and equal opportunity while making different choices and producing different statistical outcomes.

Not every disparity is evidence of discrimination. Some disparities may result from culture, preferences, family responsibilities, personality, risk tolerance, biology, economic circumstances, or countless other variables. Treating every difference in outcome as proof of oppression can produce an analytical framework that is incapable of distinguishing discrimination from ordinary human variation.

This does not mean that discrimination should be ignored. It means that claims of discrimination should be demonstrated rather than assumed. A serious commitment to women's equality should be confident enough to rely on evidence rather than requiring every disparity to confirm the theory.

The emotional dimension of modern feminism presents another challenge. Political movements naturally appeal to emotion because political questions involve deeply personal experiences. Anger at injustice can motivate positive social change. Fear, resentment, and grievance can also become powerful political tools.

A healthy feminist movement should therefore be capable of distinguishing between emotional experience and empirical claim. A woman can sincerely feel threatened without every explanation for that feeling being correct. A personal experience can be meaningful without automatically establishing a universal social principle. Empathy should inform political judgment without replacing evidence.

The tendency toward false dichotomies is equally damaging. Men and women can be portrayed as opposing political classes: women as victims and men as beneficiaries, women as oppressed and men as oppressors. Such generalizations obscure the enormous diversity within both sexes.

Most men are not responsible for the actions of other men. Most women do not share identical interests or political beliefs. Men can experience injustice, vulnerability, and discrimination, just as women can. Women can possess privilege, power, and influence, just as men can. Human beings cannot be adequately understood through a single binary.

The consequence of this framing can be a backlash. When one political movement defines itself increasingly through collective identity, other groups often respond by doing the same. A feminism that emphasizes women as a political class can encourage men to organize around male identity. Progressive identity politics can provoke conservative identity politics, which then becomes evidence for further progressive mobilization.

The cycle reinforces itself. Each side points to the excesses of the other as justification for its own increasingly tribal politics. The result is a political environment in which men and women are encouraged to see one another less as partners in a common society and more as competing constituencies.

This is particularly unfortunate because many of the challenges facing men and women are shared rather than opposed. Family stability, economic opportunity, educational achievement, public safety, meaningful employment, and the ability to raise children in a stable environment are not exclusively male or female concerns.

A politics that insists on dividing every issue according to gender can therefore obscure areas of genuine common interest. The question should not always be which sex benefits from a particular policy. It should also be whether the policy strengthens the conditions under which both men and women can flourish.

The irony is that feminism may ultimately weaken its own historic achievement if it encourages women to see themselves primarily as members of a political class rather than as autonomous individuals. The great promise of liberal feminism was that a woman's possibilities should not be determined by the category into which she was born.

That principle should remain universal. A woman should not need to think of herself as a victim to deserve equality. She should not need to adopt a particular political ideology to be considered a legitimate woman. She should not have to agree with feminist orthodoxy to possess authority over her own life.

The same principle should apply to men. A man should not be regarded as morally suspect merely because he belongs to a group described as privileged. He should be judged by his conduct and arguments, not by an inherited collective identity. Equality becomes meaningless if it requires assigning moral value according to group membership.

The crisis in modern feminism is therefore not the pursuit of women's rights. It is the possibility that a movement founded on individual equality can become absorbed by a broader ideology of collective identity. When that happens, the individual risks disappearing beneath the category.

The danger extends beyond feminism itself. Once political movements organize primarily around identity, they can begin competing for recognition, resources, institutional influence, and moral authority. The resulting politics becomes a contest among groups rather than a conversation among citizens.

Such a system can never fully satisfy its participants because every concession creates a new comparison. If one group receives recognition, another asks why it has not received the same recognition. If one group is identified as disadvantaged, another demands that its own disadvantages be acknowledged. Political life becomes an endless accounting exercise in which equality is measured through competing claims of privilege and grievance.

A liberal society requires something more ambitious than competing tribes negotiating their respective status. It requires a shared civic framework in which people with profoundly different identities can live together while retaining their individuality. People should be free to celebrate their differences without allowing those differences to become permanent political boundaries.

The solution is not to abandon feminism's achievements or pretend that discrimination has disappeared. It is to recover the strongest principle at the heart of the movement: women are individuals entitled to the same fundamental dignity, liberty, rights, and opportunities as everyone else.

That principle does not require women and men to be identical. It does not require every group to produce identical outcomes. It does not require historical differences to be forgotten. It simply requires that individuals be treated as individuals rather than as representatives of political tribes.

A mature feminism should therefore be capable of recognizing genuine discrimination without seeing discrimination everywhere, defending women's interests without defining women exclusively through victimhood, acknowledging differences without turning them into political hierarchies, and demanding equality without demanding identical outcomes.

Most importantly, it should be confident enough to tolerate disagreement from within its own ranks. A movement that claims to liberate women should not require women to surrender their intellectual independence in order to belong.

The ultimate measure of equality is not whether every woman reaches the same destination as every other woman, nor whether women collectively achieve identical outcomes to men. It is whether each individual possesses the freedom to determine her own destination without being constrained by arbitrary barriers.

Feminism began as a demand for that freedom. Its greatest achievement was to insist that women should be judged as individuals rather than confined by assumptions about what women could or should be. Its future depends, in part, on remembering that principle.

The objective should not be to replace one hierarchy with another. It should be to create a society in which neither sex is defined primarily as victim or oppressor, neither group possesses a monopoly on moral authority, and no individual is required to surrender independent thought in order to belong.

Equality should liberate people from the limitations imposed by identity, not construct new limitations in its name. A woman is more than a woman, just as a man is more than a man. Each is first and foremost an individual, possessing a unique combination of character, experience, ability, circumstance, aspiration, and choice.

The strongest feminism should therefore be a feminism that ultimately works itself out of the need for permanent political tribalism. Its success should not be measured by how effectively it keeps men and women politically divided, but by how successfully it makes unnecessary the assumption that either sex must be treated as a permanent political class.

The goal should be a society in which a woman can succeed without having to demonstrate that she belongs to an approved ideological category, disagree without being accused of betraying her sex, and pursue her ambitions without being told that her achievements are merely products of privilege or oppression.

Likewise, a man should be able to support women's equality without being required to accept collective guilt, and he should be able to question a feminist proposition without having his character dismissed along with his argument.

That is not a rejection of equality but a reassertion that equality be taken seriously.

The future of feminism should therefore not be found in deeper division, more elaborate identity classifications, or an increasingly permanent politics of grievance. It should be found in the restoration of individual agency, intellectual freedom, equal citizenship, and the recognition that human beings are considerably more complicated than the categories assigned to them.

Feminism began by challenging a world that told women what they were allowed to be. It would be a tragedy if, in seeking to liberate women from those old limitations, it created new ideological expectations about what women must believe.

The enduring principle is simpler: no woman should be defined by the expectations of men, but neither should she be defined by the expectations of a political movement. Her freedom includes the freedom to agree, disagree, succeed, fail, choose, change her mind, and determine for herself what constitutes a meaningful life.

That is the individual liberty at the heart of equality. A woman is more than a category. She is an individual. Any feminism worthy of its historical legacy should never lose sight of that fact.


Saturday, November 14, 2026

Why is Critical Race Theory so toxic? Essay 49

I first became acquainted with Critical Race Theory (CRT) in the 2000s while attending education school, where it was the primary focus of one of the courses required as part of the high-school teacher-training program. Teaching was a second profession for me, following my first career in engineering, so I was somewhat older than most of the program's students and brought with me enough life experience to recognize what I regarded as the radical character of CRT.

To me, it displayed many of the characteristics commonly associated with religious extremism or cultic belief systems. Like those belief systems, CRT presents itself as an instrument of social betterment, yet I came to regard its underlying implications as considerably more troubling, particularly as it appeared to gain increasing acceptance within elements of the neoliberal and progressive establishment and, by extension, within portions of the Democratic Party in the United States and the contemporary Liberal Party of Canada.

To understand the harshness of this assessment, it is necessary to consider CRT's origins. The theory emerged from legal studies in the 1970s, initially as a counterview to liberal approaches to race and racism. Its proponents argue that racial disparities are substantially shaped by systems and institutions that have historically been structured to preserve the interests of privileged groups, particularly whites.

CRT draws heavily from various schools of critical theory that emerged after the Second World War, many of which examined society primarily through relationships of power and were influenced by Marxist critiques of liberalism. In CRT, race became a central analytical category in ways that paralleled earlier revisions of class-based analysis.

From this perspective, CRT ultimately seeks to deconstruct existing structures of power and replace them with a different conception of social justice. Since its emergence, the framework has spread beyond legal scholarship into numerous areas of the humanities and social sciences, while also influencing debates in fields traditionally regarded as more objective or technical.

Its concepts have appeared in corporate settings, educational institutions, government organizations, and the military. I regard this expansion as deeply troubling because, in my view, an ideology that interprets society primarily through group power relations risks weakening social cohesion by emphasizing racial categories over individual circumstances and shared citizenship.

The concern is therefore no longer merely about an academic theory; it is about the influence of a broader intellectual and political movement. That distinction is important because ideas that remain confined to academic debate have a very different social impact from ideas that become embedded in institutions.

The comparison between CRT and religious extremism or cultism requires some claification. CRT is not a religion, and its adherents do not constitute a single organized cult. A more relevant characterization concerns methodology: the ways in which belief is constructed, challenged, defended, and applied.

Examined from that perspective, I see a series of similarities that I find disturbing. Each system can posit an overriding problem within society and then interpret a wide range of events through that problem. Religious extremists may identify decadence, alienation, moral corruption, or spiritual decline as the central affliction, while CRT identifies systemic racism as a foundational problem.

In both cases, complex and multifaceted social conditions can be reduced to a dominant explanatory factor through which other evidence is interpreted. Such reductionism can make complicated social problems easier to explain, but it can also make contrary evidence more difficult to accommodate.

Both approaches can also place considerable emphasis on group identity rather than the individual. CRT faces an additional theoretical challenge in the longstanding debate between essentialist and anti-essentialist approaches to race and identity, particularly when intersectional factors such as race, gender, class, and sexuality are introduced.

The resulting framework can become increasingly complex while still placing group categories at the center of analysis. In my view, this creates a tension between recognizing individuals as unique human beings and interpreting them primarily as members of social categories.

Another concern involves the treatment of empirical evidence. Critics of ideological movements frequently argue that adherents can selectively emphasize evidence that supports their assumptions while discounting evidence that complicates them. I believe this problem can arise within CRT as well as within religious extremism.

Examples involving racial disparities in crime, educational outcomes, income, or other social measures can become politically difficult when they do not fit a preferred explanatory framework. The danger arises when a theory becomes effectively unfalsifiable, with contradictory evidence being explained away by modifying the theory rather than reconsidering its assumptions.

The result is a situation in which the conclusion precedes the evidence and the evidentiary standard shifts whenever necessary to protect the conclusion. Any intellectual framework should be open to evidence capable of challenging its fundamental assumptions.

CRT and religious extremism can also display an uneasy relationship with Western liberalism. Both may criticize fundamental elements of the liberal order while simultaneously using the political, legal, and institutional mechanisms created by that order to advance their objectives.

Democratic institutions, free-speech protections, universities, courts, corporations, and electoral politics can become instruments for transforming the very system being criticized. Political movements routinely seek to change institutions through democratic means, so that fact alone is not inherently illegitimate.

The concern arises when a movement rejects the underlying principles of pluralism while continuing to exploit the protections that pluralism provides. Liberal democracy depends upon allowing competing ideas to exist without requiring universal ideological agreement.

The struggle for the hearts and minds of younger generations represents another important area of overlap. Religious movements have historically understood the importance of shaping the beliefs of children and adolescents, while contemporary ideological movements also recognize the enormous influence of education.

CRT-related concepts have consequently become part of broader debates over curricula, teacher training, institutional policies, and educational philosophy. The critical question is whether education should cultivate independent thought and intellectual diversity or primarily transmit a particular ideological interpretation of society.

Victimhood can likewise become an important source of political and moral authority. Groups or individuals who experience opposition may characterize that opposition as evidence of persecution, discrimination, or systemic hostility. Such claims can sometimes be entirely legitimate, but the concept becomes problematic when disagreement itself is treated as evidence of oppression.

A movement that regards criticism as proof of the critic's moral corruption becomes increasingly resistant to external scrutiny. Democratic discourse requires the ability to distinguish genuine discrimination from ordinary disagreement, criticism, and political opposition.

A related problem is the treatment of the Enlightenment, science, and reason. Critics of CRT have argued that some versions of the theory are skeptical of universal claims, objective knowledge, and traditional conceptions of scientific inquiry.

The use of specialized language and the redefinition of familiar terms can sometimes make ideological claims difficult for outsiders to evaluate. When ordinary words acquire specialized meanings within an intellectual community, disagreement can become less a matter of evidence than of competing definitions.

Genuine intellectual disciplines certainly use specialized terminology, but specialized language becomes problematic when it functions primarily to insulate an argument from criticism. Complex language should clarify an argument rather than make it inaccessible to those who question it.

The transformation of ordinary moral language presents another concern. Consider the phrase "All Lives Matter." Whatever one's political interpretation of the phrase, it expresses a universal proposition that is consistent with the liberal principle that every individual possesses equal moral worth.

Within some political contexts, however, the phrase has been interpreted as hostile to the specific concerns expressed by the Black Lives Matter movement. The distinction between a universal moral proposition and a political movement bearing a particular name is therefore important.

Disagreement with an organization, slogan, or policy should not automatically be interpreted as hostility toward the underlying moral principle. Political debate becomes distorted when disagreement with a particular movement is equated with rejection of the moral value that movement claims to represent.

Appeals to emotion can similarly overwhelm objective analysis. Standpoint epistemology and related approaches place significant emphasis on the idea that an individual's social position can shape or provide privileged insight into their understanding of reality.

Personal experience is undeniably important, and lived experience can provide information that outsiders may lack. The problem arises when subjective experience is treated as inherently superior to evidence that contradicts it. A person's experience deserves consideration, but consideration is not the same as exemption from empirical scrutiny.

Historical narratives can also become ideological instruments. The controversy surrounding the 1619 Project illustrates how historical interpretation can become intertwined with broader political arguments. The project has been influential and has generated substantial scholarly debate, including disputes over particular historical claims and interpretations.

Religious traditions provide another example in a different form, with creation narratives and metaphysical accounts serving as foundational explanations for believers. The common issue is not that historical interpretation or religious belief is inherently illegitimate, but that a narrative becomes problematic when it is presented as beyond meaningful criticism.

Hostility toward outsiders can become particularly corrosive. Religious extremists may characterize non-believers as morally inferior, while ideological movements can sometimes portray dissenters as racist, ignorant, or otherwise morally defective.

In the contemporary environment, opponents of controversial ideas may also face accusations of bigotry, attempts at social exclusion, professional consequences, or online harassment. Tactics such as cancellation, gaslighting, doxxing, and ad hominem attacks can be used by people on opposing sides of political and ideological disputes.

Such tactics are especially troubling when they replace argument with intimidation. A healthy intellectual culture should allow people to challenge prevailing ideas without being treated as morally illegitimate simply for doing so.

The existence of an intellectual elite can reinforce these dynamics. Academic and ideological movements often develop their own recognized authorities, credentialed experts, specialized vocabulary, journals, institutions, and professional networks.

Expertise is valuable, but credentialism becomes problematic when credentials are treated as a substitute for evidence or when questioning an established authority is portrayed as proof of ignorance. Claims should ultimately stand or fall on the quality of their evidence and reasoning rather than on the status of the person making them.

Financial and social incentives can complicate matters further. Scholars, consultants, activists, speakers, organizations, corporations, and political figures can all benefit materially or professionally from the continued prominence of particular ideas.

Such incentives do not demonstrate that the ideas are false, nor do they establish improper motives. They do, however, justify examining incentives whenever a movement acquires significant institutional power.

Governments and corporations can also become targets of organized pressure, with institutions sometimes adopting ideological positions partly because they fear reputational or political consequences. Public institutions should be particularly careful to distinguish genuine public-interest concerns from pressure generated by ideological campaigns.

Ideological movements can become particularly resistant to the possibility of being wrong. Religious extremists may invoke theological certainty, while political activists can employ rhetorical strategies that redefine opponents as insufficiently committed to the movement's principles.

The No True Scotsman fallacy can become useful in such circumstances: when an adherent behaves in a way that contradicts the movement's stated principles, that person can simply be declared an inauthentic representative. Language games and shifting definitions can serve a similar purpose by making the ideology difficult to disprove.

Asymmetrical standards can also emerge around free speech and discrimination. Individuals may demand broad protections for speech that advances their own objectives while supporting restrictions when opponents express contrary views.

Asymmetry is not unique to CRT or religious extremism; it is a recurring temptation within political movements of every kind. The same principle should therefore be applied consistently: if an expression is protected when one's allies make it, the protection should not disappear when one's opponents make it.

Both ideological and religious movements can also depend heavily on sympathetic members of the broader public to communicate a simplified version of their message. Those messengers may begin with a relatively moderate proposition and gradually absorb more expansive claims.

The movement benefits from the legitimacy of the moderate message, while dissenters within the movement may discover that deviation from the accepted script carries social or professional costs. This dynamic can make an ideology appear more broadly consensual than it actually is.

Guilt is another powerful instrument. Religious extremism can mobilize the concept of sin, while CRT-related activism can sometimes appeal to concepts such as collective responsibility, privilege, or inherited racial guilt.

In the American context, slavery occupies an especially important place in this moral framework. The historical reality of slavery and its profound consequences should be fully acknowledged, yet the question of whether contemporary individuals should bear moral responsibility for historical actions committed by people with whom they share only a racial or national identity is a separate philosophical and political question.

Distinguishing historical responsibility from individual moral culpability is essential. Acknowledging historical injustice does not necessarily require assigning personal guilt to individuals who did not participate in it.

The relationship between ideology and violence presents an even more serious concern. Religious extremism has, in some cases, justified violence in the pursuit of political or spiritual objectives. Political movements of various kinds have likewise tolerated or rationalized violence when they believe the cause is sufficiently important.

Claims that violence is necessary to achieve justice should therefore be examined with particular skepticism regardless of the ideology making them. The legitimacy of an objective does not automatically legitimize every method used to pursue it.

Semantic overload can further strengthen ideological movements by making disagreement with an organization appear equivalent to disagreement with a moral principle. The phrase "Black Lives Matter" is a straightforward moral proposition with which no reasonable person reasoning applies when Islamist movements claim to represent authentic Islam and then characterize opposition to their political ideology as opposition to Islam itself. A movement should not be allowed to monopolize the meaning of the moral or religious concepts contained in its name should have difficulty.

The Black Lives Matter organization, however, is a specific political organization with particular positions and activities. Opposition to that organization does not logically constitute opposition to the proposition that Black lives have value.

Similar reasoning applies when Islamist movements claim to represent authentic Islam and then characterize opposition to their political ideology as opposition to Islam itself. A movement should not be allowed to monopolize the meaning of the moral or religious concepts contained in its name.

Logical inconsistencies within ideological frameworks can also provide useful tests. If a social system is specifically designed to privilege one racial group, for example, explanations must account for outcomes that do not conform to that expectation.

The educational, economic, and professional achievements of Asian Americans provide one such challenge to simple racial models of privilege, while the success of particular immigrant communities can raise similar questions. Such evidence does not automatically disprove the existence of systemic discrimination, but it does demonstrate why broad claims require nuanced explanations rather than a single universal theory.

Projection is another recurring feature of ideological conflict. Religious extremists may accuse competing religions of intolerance while displaying intolerance toward them, while political activists may accuse opponents of bigotry while advancing arguments that critics regard as discriminatory.

Contradictions do not prove that an entire movement is invalid, but they should encourage greater scrutiny of whether principles are being applied consistently. A movement that condemns discrimination should be particularly careful to ensure that its own standards do not become discriminatory when applied to those outside the movement.

The final concern is the absence of a clearly defined limit on how far an ideology can extend once its fundamental assumptions are accepted. Extreme movements often begin with propositions that sound reasonable when considered in isolation and then construct increasingly expansive conclusions from them.

The difficulty arises when each new claim is treated as necessary to remain faithful to the original principle. Without internal limits, an ideology can continually move toward more radical applications while portraying every stage as merely the logical consequence of the previous one.

The similarities I have identified could be developed considerably further, but the broader pattern is what concerns me most. In my view, CRT can become an affront to the rationalism, empiricism, individualism, and intellectual pluralism associated with the Enlightenment when it treats group identity and power relations as overriding explanations for social reality.

I also do not believe that racial prejudice can be adequately addressed by replacing one form of racial categorization with another. Contemporary Western societies contain genuine racial disparities and instances of discrimination, yet addressing those problems requires careful distinctions between individual prejudice, institutional practices, historical injustice, socioeconomic conditions, and measurable differences in outcomes.

The most frightening aspect, in my view, is the potential for a totalitarian style of thought to emerge when any ideology becomes convinced that it possesses a privileged understanding of social reality and therefore has the right to silence, marginalize, or punish dissent.

Tendencies of this type can disguise themselves through carefully constructed language that makes coercion appear compassionate and ideological conformity appear virtuous. The danger does not lie solely in the ideas themselves but in the zeal with which they may be enforced and in the willingness of institutions and elites to accommodate them without sufficient scrutiny.

The proper response to controversial ideas should not be another dogma. Critical Race Theory deserves to be examined through evidence, historical scholarship, empirical research, philosophical argument, and open debate.

Its claims should be capable of being challenged without accusations of moral corruption being substituted for evidence. The same standard should apply to every ideology, including those that oppose CRT.

Intellectual freedom requires more than the right to express ideas with which we agree; it requires the willingness to permit scrutiny of ideas with which we profoundly disagree. A society that loses that capacity risks replacing the pursuit of truth with the protection of doctrine.


What were the key events in the reign of the French king Louis XIV? Entry 38

Louis XIV ascended to the French throne in 1643 at the age of four. Until he reached adulthood, France was effectively governed by his mother, Anne of Austria, and her chief minister, Cardinal Mazarin. During these early years, Louis was largely a figurehead. He experienced the turmoil of the Fronde revolt and, according to contemporary accounts, was nearly captured when rebels entered the royal residence in Paris. The instability and insecurity of his childhood helped shape his later distrust of Paris and the French nobility.

Under Mazarin’s tutelage, however, Louis developed a deep appreciation for the arts, ceremony, and high culture. He also received a rigorous education in administration, diplomacy, and the responsibilities of kingship. These lessons would become important features of his later rule. Until Mazarin’s death, however, the cardinal remained the dominant force behind French policy.

In 1661, Mazarin died, and Louis announced that he would henceforth govern without a chief minister. From this point onward, he emerged as king in both name and practice. Louis had married Marie-ThĂ©rèse of Austria, daughter of the Spanish king Philip IV, in 1660 as part of the settlement ending the Franco-Spanish War. The marriage would later become significant in Louis’s dynastic ambitions.

Louis was a firm believer in the Divine Right of Kings. He regarded his authority as ordained by God and saw the monarchy as the central institution around which the French state revolved. His famous association with the sun symbolized his conception of kingship: just as the sun stood at the center of the solar system, the king stood at the center of the political and social order. The sobriquet “Sun King” (le Roi Soleil) therefore captured both his magnificence and his conception of royal authority.

In the day-to-day administration of France, Louis relied heavily on talented ministers, particularly Jean-Baptiste Colbert and Hugues de Lionne. Colbert played a major role in strengthening French finances and promoting economic development. He sought to improve tax administration and reduce the corruption and inefficiency that plagued the existing system. The taille, France’s principal direct tax, was particularly problematic because many members of the nobility and clergy enjoyed exemptions or privileges. Colbert worked to make tax collection more efficient, although he was unable to eliminate the fundamental inequalities built into the system.

In economic policy, Colbert embraced mercantilism, a system that emphasized state intervention, the expansion of domestic manufacturing, the promotion of exports, and the restriction of imports through tariffs and other trade barriers. The objective was to increase France’s wealth and strengthen the state by encouraging domestic production and reducing dependence on foreign goods. Colbert sponsored new industries, improved infrastructure, and established or supported royal manufacturing enterprises. Although mercantilist policies could stimulate particular industries and increase state revenues, their long-term effectiveness remains debated, and later economists such as Adam Smith strongly criticized the system’s restrictive approach to international trade.

Hugues de Lionne exercised greater influence over foreign policy. He helped formulate an ambitious diplomatic strategy that sought to strengthen France’s position in Europe and exploit the declining power of Spain and the Habsburgs. This expansionist approach contributed to several of the wars that would dominate Louis XIV’s reign.

One of the defining achievements of Louis’s reign was the transformation of the Palace of Versailles into the principal seat of the French monarchy. Louis regarded Versailles as a magnificent symbol of French power, wealth, and cultural achievement. He also used the palace as a means of bringing the nobility into the orbit of the monarchy. By encouraging nobles to participate in the elaborate rituals and social life of the royal court, Louis could reward loyalty, monitor political rivals, and reduce their ability to build independent power bases in the provinces.

Versailles was therefore both a cultural monument and a political instrument. However, its enormous construction and maintenance costs placed a considerable burden on the royal treasury. The concentration of political life at Versailles also further separated the monarchy from the ordinary population of France.

Louis took an unusually active interest in administration. He maintained a highly structured daily routine and personally reviewed many aspects of government. His reign saw major investments in roads, canals, ports, fortifications, and manufacturing. These policies helped strengthen France’s commercial and military infrastructure and contributed to its emergence as one of Europe’s leading economic and military powers.

Louis was also a major patron of the arts. He supported writers, playwrights, musicians, architects, and painters and used culture as an instrument of royal prestige. He was a patron of figures such as Molière and Racine, while the visual arts and architecture flourished under royal sponsorship. French culture consequently became enormously influential throughout Europe during his reign.

Yet Louis’s legacy was also deeply tarnished by his religious policies. In 1685, the Edict of Fontainebleau revoked the Edict of Nantes, which had provided a degree of religious toleration to France’s Protestant population since 1598. The revocation led to intensified persecution of the Huguenots, or French Calvinists, including restrictions on worship and pressure to convert to Catholicism. Hundreds of thousands of Huguenots eventually fled France despite efforts to prevent their departure.

The exodus had significant consequences. Many of the refugees were skilled artisans, merchants, professionals, and intellectuals who carried their expertise to countries such as England, the Dutch Republic, Prussia, Switzerland, and the American colonies. Their departure deprived France of valuable human and economic capital while strengthening some of the economies that welcomed them.

Louis XIV therefore left a complex legacy. He presided over the height of French absolutism and transformed France into the pre-eminent cultural and military power of continental Europe. At the same time, his centralized rule, costly wars, immense expenditures, and religious intolerance created significant burdens that would outlast his reign.


Wednesday, November 11, 2026

Where are the Aliens? Essay 48

The following question has always bothered me: If superior intelligent extraterrestrial civilizations do exist, why have they not contacted us?

An obvious assumption is that, if intelligent life exists elsewhere and is sufficiently advanced, it should eventually discover us. Yet despite our growing ability to observe the universe, we remain apparently isolated. Could it be that  the absence of contact does not mean that we are alone but that we are being kept alone.

Imagine for a moment that Earth exists within some kind of protected zone. A guardian species—whether originating from our own dimension or perhaps from another entirely—has designated our planet as off-limits to other extraterrestrial civilizations. The purpose would not necessarily be sinister. On the contrary, it could be an attempt to protect humanity from contact with species whose technological and cultural advancement is so far beyond ours that their influence could prove harmful to us.

After all, contact with a civilization vastly more advanced than our own could have consequences that are impossible for us to anticipate. Their technology alone could radically transform human society. Their ideas, values, and methods of organizing themselves could overwhelm institutions that have taken thousands of years to develop. We might benefit enormously from such an encounter, but we might also lose something essential in the process. Perhaps the guardians believe that humanity must first develop sufficiently on its own before it can safely encounter those who are far ahead of us.

I find it difficult to believe that such protection, if it exists, would necessarily last forever. Humanity may remain within this protected zone for the entire lifetime of our species, but I suspect that is not the case. Maybe  the guardians are observing us and waiting for some indication that we have reached a sufficient level of maturity. When they become convinced that we are capable of weathering an encounter with a more advanced alien culture without being overwhelmed or destroyed by it, they may remove whatever barriers separate us from the wider extraterrestrial community.

At that point, contact would no longer be prohibited. It would simply become permissible.

Of course, this is nothing more than speculation. There is no evidence that such guardians exist, let alone that they have placed Earth under some form of extraterrestrial protection. But as a thought experiment, it offers an interesting explanation for what otherwise seems to be a rather profound silence.

It may be that those strange objects that so many people have reported seeing in the skies above us are not visiting spacecraft in the conventional sense but  they are something much more interesting: the guardians themselves, periodically checking on the progress of their protected species.

If that were true, then humanity might not be alone at all. We might simply be waiting for permission to meet our neighbours